银行的资本金是干什么的？吸收亏损和坏帐用的。经济好时，它大增。经济坏时，它被损耗，甚至变成负数。等到下一个周期到来，资本金又得到自动充值。如此循环。这就象财政储备（和家庭积蓄）一样。

但是，西方（和中国）银监当局要求银行一直（永远）保持很高的资本充足率。这非常错误。在经济萧条时，他们逼着银行打掉坏帐，补充资本金。这听起来是个好主意，但是十分危险，十分愚蠢！经济萧条时，谁愿意为银行增资？况且，这时增资，对原来的股东基本上是浩劫。现在欧洲的银行业面临的就是这个问题。他们在危险的谷底站不起来，而银监当局还拿着皮鞭抽他们。

他们不断关闭海内外分行，出售资产。但是，他们痛苦地发现，越是瘦身，资本金越是不够。为什么？每次瘦身都会把大量的坏帐"表面化"，资本金显得更加不足！结果，他们又想瘦身，又害怕瘦身。很多银行嚷嚷要瘦身, 但是几年下来没有动静。 非不为也, 唯不能也。

1999年，中国创立了四大资产管理公司（信达等），并对银行补充资本金，结果导致了十多年的信贷膨胀，这个炸弹如何解决，谁也不知道。当时，政府本应该"无为"，让银行继续空转，自然康复。那样，中国就不会有今天的信贷炸弹。但是，IMF和世界银行不断怂恿，咱们抵挡不住东施效颦的诱惑, 引发了大量的高能货币。当时，银行的流动性非常好（存贷两旺），公众对银行的信心也从来没有动摇。所以，那次的银行改革（搞四大资产管理公司），不光是多此一举，而且是害处多多。

结论：在经济萧条时期，大家必须让银行有"空转"的自由。行尸走肉的银行对社会有大大的好处。现在，中国所有银行的坏帐都多得要命。他们提取多少坏帐，反映多少坏帐，根本不重要。大家不要太认真。让它们即使空转，他们终究会迎来下一轮的繁荣。不要逼着他们撇帐，不要逼着他们补充资本金。

这就是本文的核心。2012－13年，我在南华早报和英国"经济学家"杂志发表过类似观点的文章。

SCMP,  7 Sept. 2016,  by Joe Zhang,

How to predict nine out of the next five China crises...

For the past four years, analysts at Fitch Ratings and Wall Street banks have shared a consensus: a credit crisis will break out in China at any time. Their prediction was based on two factors: China’s economy was slowing sharply, and bad debts would lead to bank runs. Above all, the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio was alarmingly high and climbing. But, four years on, a credit crisis seems a more remote possibility.

Look at the current situation: China’s banks are still very liquid; loan growth has stayed at a 10 per cent clip; public confidence in the banks is unquestioned; and external debts are manageable.

It is true that the number of officially reported bad debts may be only a fraction of the actual figures. It is also true that some banks may be running on a very low or even negative equity as their bad debts may have wiped out their capital cushion. But does that really matter? Capital cushions are there to be wiped out, by design. In bad times – like today – capital gets depleted, and come the good times, the banks will make a killing and build the cushions again. Even in bad times such as these, China’s banks continue to pay very high dividends despite analysts’ constant talk of rising bad debts and thin capital cushions.

And, it is worth highlighting that non-bank financial institutions in China have fared much worse in the current economic downturn. A large number of crippled microlenders, and failed trust companies, guarantee companies and even leasing companies litter the landscape. And it is easy to see why, since their cost of input (that is, funding cost) is the banks’ cost of output. In other words, they not only operate in a subprime sector but they are also at the mercy of the banks. Securities firms (dealer-brokers) are now also becoming risky lenders in the already inflated A-share market while the insurance sector is slowing. Some analysts argue that, compared to the US or Europe, market penetration of China’s insurance services is very low and that it has huge growth potential. But in the short to medium term, the sector looks overserved and wildly competitive.

A slower economy is the cause of banking distress in China and parts of Europe. But if the governments of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain had China’s kind of total freedom in setting fiscal and monetary policies, their own banking sector distress would be much easier to manage.

Since this kind of banking distress, in most cases, is a reflection of a slower economy, it is natural to wonder how Beijing is going to boost growth. I think the government, knowingly or unknowingly, is experimenting with just how much of an economic slowdown the country can tolerate. Beijing is clearly not priming the pump as much as it is capable of doing.

The last stimulus in 2008 has now been badly discredited and there is no appetite for a repeat of that scenario. Thankfully, labour market pressure is mild, after the 35-year cycle of family planning which has ensured that workers are not flooding the marketplace. So it is safe to say that China can afford to slow down much more, as the economy appears resilient enough.

So what do we make of supply-side reforms? Sadly, I believe the push for reforms is mostly lip service at present since Beijing is not cutting taxes, red tape is still a big headache, and state-owned enterprises, instead of being sold or downsized, are regaining dominance at the expense of private-sector rivals.

Rural land reform is unfolding slowly. Farmers need the reform to benefit from economies of scale, and to be able to use their land as collateral for bank credit. It is safe to expect the market value of rural land to rise significantly on the back of the reforms. This is long overdue, as the country’s economic growth and asset price inflation of the past two decades have left farmers far behind city residents. 

Overall, China’s economy is probably not growing at present, judging from power consumption and transport volumes. But it is a blessing in disguise. A recession is a much-needed shock if China wants to transform its economy into one led by domestic consumption. In such a transition, banks would suffer enormous pain, obviously, but it is far too simplistic to predict a banking crisis.

Joe Zhang is the chairman of China Smartpay Group, and a formermanager at the People’s Bank of China.